Decision Theory with Prospect Interference and Entanglement by Yukalov, V. I. & Sornette, D.
ar
X
iv
:1
10
2.
27
38
v1
  [
ma
th-
ph
]  
14
 Fe
b 2
01
1
Decision Theory with Prospect Interference and
Entanglement
V.I. Yukalov
1,2
and D. Sornette
1,3
1Department of Management, Technology and Economics,
ETH Zu¨rich, Zu¨rich CH-8032, Switzerland,
2Bogolubov Laboratory of Theoretical Physics,
Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, Dubna 141980, Russia
3Swiss Finance Institute,
c/o University of Geneva, 40 blvd. Du Pont d’Arve, CH 1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland
Address for correspondence:
Prof. V.I. Yukalov
Department of Management, Technology and Economics,
ETH Zu¨rich, Zu¨rich CH-8032, Switzerland
Office phone: +41 (44) 632 - 0848
E-mail: yukalov@theor.jinr.ru
1
Abstract
We present a novel variant of decision making based on the mathematical theory of
separable Hilbert spaces. This mathematical structure captures the effect of superposi-
tion of composite prospects, including many incorporated intentions, which allows us to
describe a variety of interesting fallacies and anomalies that have been reported to par-
ticularize the decision making of real human beings. The theory characterizes entangled
decision making, non-commutativity of subsequent decisions, and intention interference.
We demonstrate how the violation of the Savage’s sure-thing principle, known as the dis-
junction effect, can be explained quantitatively as a result of the interference of intentions,
when making decisions under uncertainty. The disjunction effects, observed in experiments,
are accurately predicted using a theorem on interference alternation that we derive, which
connects aversion-to-uncertainty to the appearance of negative interference terms suppress-
ing the probability of actions. The conjunction fallacy is also explained by the presence of
the interference terms. A series of experiments are analysed and shown to be in excellent
agreement with a priori evaluation of interference effects. The conjunction fallacy is also
shown to be a sufficient condition for the disjunction effect and novel experiments testing
the combined interplay between the two effects are suggested.
KEYWORDS: decision making, entangled decisions, intention interference, interference alter-
nation, disjunction effect, conjunction fallacy, uncertainty aversion, decision noncommutativity
JEL CLASSIFICATIONS: C10, C40, C44, D03
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1 Introduction
Decision theory is concerned with identifying what are the optimal decisions and how to reach
them. Most of decision theory is normative and prescriptive, and assumes that people are fully-
informed and rational. These assumptions have been questioned early on with the evidence
provided by the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953) and many other behavioral paradoxes (Camerer
et al., 2003), showing that humans often seem to deviate from the prescription of rational de-
cision theory due to cognitive and emotion biases. The theories of bounded rationality (Simon,
1955) of behavioral economics and of behavioral finance have attempted to account for these
deviations. As reviewed by Machina (2008), alternative models of preferences over objectively
or subjectively uncertain prospects have attempted to accommodate these systematic departures
from the expected utility model while retaining as much of its analytical power as possible. In
particular, non-additive nonlinear probability models have been developed to account for the
deviations from objective to subjective probabilities observed in human agents (Quiggin, 1982;
Gilboa, 1987; Schmeidler, 1989; Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Cohen and Tallon, 2000; Mon-
tesano, 2008). However, many paradoxes remain unexplained or are sometimes rationalized on
an ad hoc basis, which does not provide much predictive power. Various attempts to extend
utility theory by constructing non-expected utility functionals (Machina, 2008) cannot resolve
the known classical paradoxes (Safra and Segal, 2008). Moreover, extending the classical utility
theory ”ends up creating more paradoxes and inconsistencies than it resolves” (Al-Najjar and
Weinstein, 2009).
Here, we propose a novel approach, developed as a part of the mathematical theory of Hilbert
spaces (Dieudonne´, 2006) and employing the mathematical techniques that are used in quantum
theory. Because of the latter, we call this approach the Quantum Decision Theory (QDT). This
approach can be thought of as the mathematically simplest and most natural extension of ob-
jective probabilities into nonlinear subjective probabilities. The proposed formalism allows us to
explain quantitatively the disjunction and conjunction effects. The disjunction effect is the failure
of humans to obey the sure-thing principle of classical probability theory. The conjunction effect
is a logical fallacy that occurs when people assume that specific conditions are more probable
than a single general one. Our QDT unearths a deep relationship between the conjunction and
the disjunction effects. We show that the former is sufficient for the later to exist.
QDT uses the same underlying mathematical structure as the one developed to establish a
rigorous formulation of quantum mechanics (von Neumann, 1955). Based on the mathematical
theory of separable Hilbert spaces, quantum mechanics showed how to reconcile and combine the
continuous wave description with the fact that waves are organized in discrete energy packets,
called quanta, that behave in a manner similar to particles. Analogously, in our framework,
the qualifier quantum emphasizes the fact that a decision is a discrete selection from a large
set of entangled options. Our key idea is to provide the simplest generalization of the classical
probability theory underlying decision theory, so as to account for the complex dynamics of
the many nonlocal hidden variables that may be involved in the cognitive and decision making
processes of the brain. The mathematical theory of complex separable Hilbert spaces provides
the simplest direct way to avoid dealing with the unknown hidden variables, and at the same time
reflecting the complexity of nature (Yukalov, 1975). In decision making, the hidden variables can
be the many unknown states of nature, the emotions, and subconscious processes.
However, it is necessary to stress that our approach does not require that a decision maker
be a quantum object. All analogies with quantum processes have to be understood solely as
mathematical analogies helping the reader to catch why the functional analysis is really an
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appropriate tool for modeling decision making. Before presenting our approach, it is useful to
briefly mention previous studies of decision making and of the associated cognitive processes of
the brain which, superficially, could be considered as related to our approach. This exposition
will allow us to underline the originality and uniqueness of our approach. We do not touch here
purely physiological aspects of the problem, which are studied in medicine and the cognitive
sciences. Concerning the functional aspects of decision making, we focus our efforts towards its
mathematical modeling.
Two main classes of theories invoke the qualifier “quantum”. In the first class, one finds
investigations which attempt to represent the brain as a quantum or quantum-like object (Pen-
rose, 1989; Lockwood, 1989; Satinover, 2001), for which several mechanisms have been suggested
(Fro¨hlich, 1968; Stuart et al., 1978, 1979; Beck and Eccles, 1992; Vitiello, 1995; Hagan et al.,
2002; Pessa and Vitiello, 2003). The existence of genuine quantum effects and the operation
of any of these mechanisms in the brain remain however controversial and have been criticized
by Tegmark (2000) as being unrealistic. Another approach in this first class appeals to the
mind-matter duality, treating mind and matter as complementary aspects and considering con-
sciousness as a separate fundamental entity (Chalmers, 1996; Atmanspacher et al., 2002; Primas,
2003; Atmanspacher, 2003). This allows one, without insisting on the quantum nature of the
brain processes, if any, to ascribe quantum properties solely to the consciousness itself, as has
been advocated by Stapp (1993, 1999).
Actually, the basic idea that mental processes are similar to quantum-mechanical phenomena
goes back to Niels Bohr. One of the first publications on this analogy is his paper (Bohr, 1929).
Later on, he discussed many times the similarity between quantum mechanics and the function of
the brain, for instance in Bohr (1933, 1937, 1961). This analogy proposes that mental processes
could be modeled by quantum-mechanical wave functions, with all the consequences following
from the mathematical properties of these objects. One of such immediate consequences would
be the appearance of interference effects that are typical of quantum mechanics.
The second class of theories does not necessarily assume quantum properties of the brain or
that consciousness is a separate entity with quantum characteristics. Rather, these approaches
use quantum techniques, as a convenient language to generalize classical probability theory. An
example is provided by so-called quantum games (Meyer, 1999; Goldenberg et al., 1999; Eisert
and Wilkens, 2000; Johnson, 2001; Benjamin and Hayden 2001; Iqbal and Toor, 2001; Li et
al., 2001; Du et al., 2001, 2002; Lee and Johnson, 2003). According to van Enk and Pike
(2002), any quantum game can be reformulated as a classical game rigged with some additional
conditions. Another example is the Shor (1997) algorithm, which is purely quantum-mechanical,
but is solving the classical factoring problem. This shows that there is no contradiction in using
quantum techniques for describing classical problems.
In any case, whether we deal really with a genuine quantum system or with an extremely
complex classical system, the language of quantum theory can be a convenient effective tool
for describing such complex systems (Yukalov, 1975). When dealing with genuinely quantum
systems, the QDT provides natural algorithms that could be used for quantum information
processing, the operation of quantum computers, and in creating artificial quantum intelligence
(Yukalov and Sornette, 2008, 2009). In the case of decision making performed by real people,
the subconscious activity and the underlying emotions, which are difficult to quantify, play the
role of the hidden variables appearing in quantum theory.
It is important to stress that we do not assume that human brain has anything to do with a
real quantum object or that consciousness possesses some underlying quantum nature. But we
use the theory of complex separable Hilbert spaces as a mathematical language that is convenient
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for the formal description of complicated processes associated with decision making. What we
actually need is just the mathematical theory of Hilbert spaces. We could even avoid the use
of the term ”quantum”, since there is no any quantum mechanics, as a physical theory, in
our approach. The sole common thing between our QDT and quantum mechanics is that both
employ the theory of Hilbert spaces, characterizing the states as vectors in this space. We use the
denomination ”quantum” for brevity and because quantum theory is also based on the theory
of Hilbert spaces. In that way, we employ the techniques of quantum theory as a convenient
mathematical tool, without assuming any genuine underlying quantum processes.
As another analogy, we can mention the theory of differential equations, which was initially
developed for describing the motion of planets. But later on, this theory has been extended to
numerous problems, having nothing to do with the motion of planets, and employed in a variety
of branches of science as a mathematical tool. To emphasize this point, we conclude the section
by the important statement that clarifies our position and helps the reader avoid any confusion.
Statement. Quantum Decision Theory is based on the mathematical techniques employed in
quantum theory, using the notion of Hilbert spaces as a formal mathematical tool. But QDT does
not require that a decision maker be necessarily a quantum object.
2 Foundations of Quantum Decision Theory
The classical approaches to decision making are based on the utility theory (von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954). Decision making in the presence of uncertainty about the
states of nature is formalized in the statistical decision theory (Lindgren, 1971; White, 1976;
Hastings and Mello, 1978; Rivett, 1980; Buchanan, 1982; Berger, 1985; Marshall and Oliver,
1995; Bather, 2000; French and Insua, 2000; Raiffa and Schlaifer, 2000; Weirich, 2001). Some
paradoxes, occurring in the interpretation of classical utility theory and its application to real
human decision processes have been discussed, e.g., by Berger (1985), Zeckhauser (2006), and
Machina (2008).
2.1 Idea of Quantum Decision Theory
Here we suggest another approach to decision making, which is principally different from the
classical utility theory. We propose to define the action probability as is done in quantum
mechanics, using the mathematical theory of complex separable Hilbert spaces. This proposition
can be justified by invoking the following analogy. The probabilistic features of quantum theory
can be interpreted as being due to the existence of the so-called nonlocal hidden variables. The
dynamical laws of these nonlocal hidden variables could be not merely extremely cumbersome,
but even not known at all, similarly to the unspecified states of nature. The formalism of quantum
theory is then formulated in such a way as to avoid dealing with unknown hidden variables, but
at the same time to reflect the complexity of nature (Yukalov, 1975). In decision making, the
role of hidden variables is played by unknown states of nature, by emotions, and by subconscious
processes, for which quantitative measures are not readily available.
In the following sub-sections, we develop the detailed description of the suggested program,
explicitly constructing the action probability in quantum-mechanical terms. The probability of
an action is intrinsically subjective, as it must characterize intended actions by human beings.
For brevity, an intended action can be called an intention or an action. In compliance with
the terminology used in the theories of decision-making, a composite set of intended actions,
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consisting of several subactions, will be called a prospect. An important feature of our approach
is that we insist on the necessity of dealing not with separate intended actions, but with composite
prospects, including many incorporated intentions. Only then it becomes possible, within the
frame of one general theory, to describe a variety of interesting unusual phenomena that have
been reported to characterize the decision making properties of real human beings.
Mathematically, our approach is based on the von Neumann theory of quantum measurements
(von Neumann, 1955). The relation of the von Neumann theory to quantum communication
procedures has been considered by Benioff (1972). We generalize the theory to be applicable
not merely to simple actions, but also to composite prospects, which is of principal importance
for the appearance of decision interference. A brief account of the axiomatics of our approach
has been published in the recent letters (Yukalov and Sornette, 2008, 2009). The aim of the
present paper is to provide a detailed explanation of the theory and to demonstrate that it can
be successfully applied to the real-life problems of decision making.
2.2 Main Definitions
In order to formulate in precise mathematical terms the process of decision making, it is necessary
to introduce several definitions. To better understand these definitions, we shall give some very
simple examples. The entity concerned with the decision making task can be a single human,
a group of humans, a society, a computer, or any other system that is able or enables to make
decisions. Throughout the paper, we shall employ the Dirac (1958) notations widely used in
quantum theory.
Definition 1. Intended actions
An intended action which, for brevity, can be called an intention or an action, is a particular
thought about doing something. Examples of intentions could be as follows: “I would like to
marry” or “I would like to be rich” or “I would like to establish a firm”. There can be a variety
of intentions Ai, which are enumerated by the index i = 1, 2, 3, . . .. Between any two intended
actions, A and B, it is possible to define the binary operations of addition and multiplication in
the same way as it is standardly done in mathematical logic (Mendelson, 1965) and probability
theory (Feller, 1970). The sum A+B means that either A or B is intended to be accomplished.
The summation of several actions is denoted as
⋃
iAi ≡ A1 +A2 + · · ·. The product AB implies
that both A and B are intended to be accomplished together. The product of several intended
actions is denoted as
⋂
iAi ≡ A1A2 · · ·. The total set of such intended actions, equipped with
these binary operations, is called the action ring.
Definition 2. Action modes
Intention representations, or action modes, are concrete implementations of an intention. For
instance, the intention “to marry” can have as representations the following variants: “to marry
A” or “to marry B”, and so on. The intention “to be rich” can have as representations “to
be rich by working hard” or “to be rich by becoming a bandit”. The intention “to establish a
firm” can have as representations “to establish a firm producing cars” or “to establish a firm
publishing books” and so on. We number the representations of an i-intention by the index
µ = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,Mi. The intention representations may include not only positive intention variants
“to do something” but also negative variants such as “not to do something”. For example, the
Hamlet’s hesitation “to be or not to be” is the intention consisting of two representations, one
positive and the other negative.
6
Definition 3. Mode states
The mode state, or representation state, of an action mode Aiµ is denoted as the vector |Aiµ >
corresponding to the µ-representation of an i-intention. This vector is a member of a linear space
to be defined below.
Definition 4. Mode basis
The mode basis, or representation basis, is the set {|Aiµ >} of the representation states |Aiµ >
corresponding to those intention representations Aiµ, which are classified as basic. Here “basic”
means the most important and fundamental, in the sense that linear combinations of the vectors
|Aiµ > exhaust the whole set of i-intentions. The members of a mode basis are supposed to be
well distinguished from each other and also normalized. This can be formalized as saying that the
representation basis is orthonormal, which implies that a form, called scalar product, is defined,
such that the scalar product < Aiµ|Aiν > yields the Kronecker delta symbol δµν :
< Aiµ|Aiν >= δµν . (1)
Definition 5. Mode space
The mode space consists of all possible intention states. It is formed as the closed linear
envelope
Mi ≡ L{|Aiµ >} (2)
spanning the mode basis {|Aiµ >}. Thus, we can assume that the mode space is a Hilbert space,
that is, a complete normed space, with the norm generated by the scalar product.
Definition 6. Intention states
The intention state at time t is a function
|ψi(t) >=
∑
µ
ciµ(t)|Aiµ > , (3)
corresponding to an i-intention, which can be represented as a linear combination of the states
from the representation basis {|Aiµ >}. The intention state (3) is a member of the mode space
(2). Since the mode space has been assumed to be a Hilbert space, the associated scalar product
exists and yields
< ψi(t1)|ψi(t2) > ≡
∑
µ
c∗iµ(t1)ciµ(t2) . (4)
The norm of the intention state (3) is generated by the scalar product (4) as
|||ψi(t) > || ≡
√
< ψi(t)|ψi(t) > . (5)
The expansion coefficients in Eq. (3) are assumed to be defined by the decision maker, so that
|ciµ|
2 gives the weight of the state |Aiµ > into the general intention state.
Definition 7. Action prospects
A prospect pij is a conjunction of several intended actions or several intention representations.
In reality, an individual is always motivated by a variety of intentions, which are mutually
interconnected. Even the realization of a single intention always involves taking into account
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many other related intentions. So, generally, a prospect is an object of the composite type
ABC · · ·, where each action can be composed of several modes.
Definition 8. Elementary prospects
An elementary prospect en is a simple prospect formed by a conjunction of single action
modes Aiνi. With each intention representation marked by the index νi, the elementary prospect
is labelled by the multi-index
n ≡ {ν1, ν2, ν3, . . .}. (6)
The elementary prospects are assumed to be mutually disjoint.
Definition 9. Basic states
Basic states are the vectors
|en > ≡ ⊗i|Aiνi > ≡ |Aiν1Aiν2 . . . > , (7)
which are mapped to the elementary prospects labelled in (6). These vectors are the tensor
products of the mode states |Aiνi >.
Definition 10. Prospect basis
The prospect basis {|en >} is the family of all basic states (7) corresponding to the elementary
prospects. Different states belonging to the prospect basis are assumed to be disjoint, in the sense
of being orthogonal. Since the modulus of each state has no special meaning, these states are
also normalized to one. This can be formalized as the orthonormality of the basis, for which
there exists a scalar product
< em|en > =
∏
i
< Aiµi |Aiνi > = δmn , (8)
where
δmn ≡
∏
i
δµiνi (9)
is the product of the Kronecker symbols.
Definition 11. Mind space
The space of mind is defined as the closed linear envelope over the prospect basis {|en >}:
M≡ L{|en >} = ⊗iMi . (10)
This is a Hilbert space, being the direct product of the mode spaces (2), which can be thought of
as a possible mathematical representation of the mind. Note that the closed linear envelope (10)
exhausts all possible states that can be expanded over the total basis {|en >}. Mathematically,
L{|en >} is identical to ⊗iMi. Therefore the product ⊗iMi is a direct consequence of the
structure of L{|en >}.
Definition 12. Mind dimensionality
The dimensionality of the mind space (10), which can be termed the dimensionality of mind,
is
dim(M) ≡
∏
i
Mi , (11)
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where Mi is the number of the i-intention modes.
Definition 13. Prospect states
A prospect state |pij > is a member of the mind space (10). The prospects are enumerated
with the index j = 1, 2, . . .. The total set {|pij >} of all prospect states |pij >, corresponding
to all admissible prospects, forms a subset of the space of mind. The set {|pij >} ⊂ M can be
called the prospect-state set. Note that the vectors |pij > are not necessarily orthogonal with
each other and, generally, are not normalized. The normalization condition will be formulated
for the prospect probabilities to be defined below.
Definition 14. Strategic state
The strategic state of mind at time t is a given specific vector
|ψs(t) >=
∑
n
cn(t)|en > , (12)
which can be represented as a linear combination of the prospect basic states {|en >}. The coef-
ficients cn(t) are given complex-valued functions of time, whose temporal evolution is associated
with the particular individual and context. The strategic state (12) belongs to the mind space
(10), which is a Hilbert state endowed with the scalar product
< ψs(t1)|ψs(t2) > ≡
∑
n
c∗n(t1)cn(t2) . (13)
The norm of the strategic state (12) is generated by the scalar product (13),
|||ψs(t) > || ≡
√
< ψs(t)|ψs(t) > . (14)
The strategic state of mind is normalized to unity, so that
|||ψs(t) > || = 1 . (15)
Then, from the definition of the scalar product (13), we have
∑
n
|cn(t)|
2 = 1 . (16)
The strategic state of mind is a fixed vector characterizing a particular decision maker, with
his/her beliefs, habits, principles, etc., that is, describing each decision maker as a unique subject.
Hence, each space of mind possesses a unique strategic state. Different decision makers possess
different strategic states.
2.3 Entangled Prospects
Prospect states can be of two qualitatively different types, disentangled and entangled.
Definition 15. Disentangled states
A disentangled prospect state is a prospect state which is represented as the tensor product
of the intention states (3):
|f(t) >= ⊗i|ψi(t) > , (17)
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We define the disentangled set as the collection of all admissible disentangled prospect states of
form (17):
D ≡ {|f >= ⊗i|ψi >, |ψi >∈Mi} . (18)
Definition 16. Entangled states
An entangled prospect state is any prospect state that cannot be reduced to the tensor product
form of disentangled prospect states (17).
In quantum theory, it is possible to construct various entangled and disentangled states
(see, e.g., Yukalov, 2003). For the purpose of developing a theory of decision making, let us
illustrate the above definitions by an example of a prospect consisting of two intentions with
two representations each. Let us consider the prospect of the following two intentions: “to get
married” and “to become rich”. And let us assume that the intention “to get married” consists
of two representations, “to marry A”, with the representation state |A >, and “to marry B”,
with the representation state |B >. And let the intention “to become rich” be formed by two
representations, “to become rich by working hard”, with the representation state |W >, and
“to become rich by being a gangster”, with the representation state |G >. Thus, there are two
intention states of type (3),
|ψ1 >= a1|A > +a2|B > , |ψ2 >= b1|W > +b2|G > . (19)
The general prospect state has the form
|pi >= c11|AW > +c12|AG > +c21|BW > +c22|BG > , (20)
where the coefficients cij belong to the field of complex numbers.
Depending on the values of the coefficients cij, the prospect state (20) can be either disen-
tangled or entangled. If it is disentangled, it must be of the tensor product type (17), which for
the present case reads
|f >= |ψ1 > ⊗|ψ2 >= a1b1|AW > +a1b2|AG > +a2b1|BW > +a2b2|BG > . (21)
Both states (20) and (21) include four elementary-prospect states (7):
• “to marry A and to work hard”, |AW >,
• “to marry A and become a gangster”, |AG >,
• “to marry B and to work hard”, |BW >,
• “to marry B and become a gangster”, |BG >.
However, the structure of states (20) and (21) is different. The prospect state (20) is more
general and can be reduced to state (21), but the opposite may not be possible. For instance,
the prospect state
c12|AG > +c21|BW > , (22)
which is a particular example of state (20) cannot be reduced to any of the states (21), provided
that both coefficients c12 and c21 are non-zero. In quantum mechanics, this state would be
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called the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen state, one of the most famous examples of an entangled state
(Einstein et al., 1935). Another example is the prospect state
c11|AW > +c22|BG > , (23)
whose quantum-mechanical analog would be called the Bell state (Bell, 1964). In the case where
both c11 and c22 are non-zero, the Bell state cannot be reduced to any of the states (21) and is
thus entangled.
In contrast with the above two examples, the prospect states
c11|AW > +c12|AG > , c11|AW > +c21|BW > ,
c12|AG > +c22|BG > , c21|BW > +c22|BG > ,
are disentangled, since all of them can be reduced to the form (21).
Since the coefficients cij = cij(t) are, in general, functions of time, it may happen that a
prospect state at a particular time is entangled, but becomes disentangled at another time or,
vice versa, a disentangled prospect state can be transformed into an entangled state with changing
time (Yukalov, 2003).
The state of a human being is governed by his/her physiological characteristics and the avail-
able information (Bechara et al., 2000; Dickhaut et al., 2003). These properties are continuously
changing in time. Hence the strategic state (12), specific of a person at a given time, may also
display temporal evolution, according to different homeostatic processes adjusting the individual
to the changing environment.
2.4 Decision Making
We describe the process of decision making as an intrinsically probabilistic procedure. The
first step consists in evaluating consciously and/or subconsciously the probabilities of choosing
different actions from the point of view of their usefulness and/or appeal to the choosing agent.
Mathematically, this is described as follows.
Definition 17. Prospect set
The total family
L ≡ {pij : j = 1, 2, . . .} (24)
of all prospects pij , among which one makes a choice, is called the prospect set.
Definition 18. Prospect operators
The prospect operator, corresponding to a prospect pij with the prospect state |pij > is
Pˆ (pij) ≡ |pij >< pij | . (25)
The prospect operators in decision theory are analogous to the operators of local observables
in quantum theory. The prospect probabilities are defined as the expectation values of the
prospect operators with respect to the given strategic state. The strategic state of mind of an
agent at some time t is represented by the state |ψs(t) >.
Definition 19. Prospect probabilities
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The probability of realizing a prospect pij , with the prospect state |pij >, under the given
strategic state |ψs(t) >, characterizing the agent’s state of mind at time t, is the expectation
value of the prospect operator (25):
p(pij) ≡< ψs(t)|Pˆ (pij)|ψs(t) >= | < pij|ψs(t) > |
2 . (26)
The prospect probabilities defined in (26) are assumed to possess all standard probability
properties, with the normalization condition∑
j
p(pij) = 1 (0 ≤ p(pij) ≤ 1) . (27)
The prospect probabilities are defined in Eq. (26) through the prospect states and the strate-
gic state of mind. The latter is normalized to one, according to Eq.(15). By their definition,
the prospect probabilities have to be summed to one, as in Eq. (27). But the prospect states
themselves do not need to be normalized to one, which means that different prospects can have,
and usually do have, different weights, corresponding to their different probabilities. In physics,
this situation would be similar to defining the cross-section in a scattering experiment over a sys-
tem containing elementary particles (elementary prospects) and composite clusters (composite
prospects) formed by several particles.
In the traditional theory of decision making, based on the utility function, the optimal de-
cision corresponds, by definition, to the maximal expected utility which is associated with the
maximal anticipated usefulness and profit resulting from the chosen action. In contrast, our QDT
recognizes that the behavior of an individual is probabilistic, not deterministic. The prospect
probability (26) quantifies the probability that a given individual chooses the prospect pij , given
his/her strategic state of mind |ψs(t) > at time t. This translates in experiments into a prediction
on the frequency of the decisions taken by an ensemble of subjects under the same conditions.
The observed frequencies of different decisions taken by an ensemble of non-interacting subjects
making a decision under the same conditions serves as the observable measure of the subjective
probability. It is, actually, the known fact that subjective probabilities can be calibrated by
frequencies or fractions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Kaplan and Garrick, 1981).
This specification also implies that the same subject, prepared under the same conditions
with the same strategic state of mind |ψs > at two different times, may choose two different
prospects among the same set of prospects, with different relative frequencies determined by
the corresponding prospect probabilities (26). Verifying this prediction is a delicate empirical
question, because of the possible impact of the “memory” of the past decisions on the next
one. In order for the prediction to hold, the two repetitions of the decision process should be
independent. Otherwise, the strategic state of mind in the second experiment keeps a memory of
the previous choice, which biases the results. This should not be confused with the fact that the
projection of the strategic state of mind onto the prospect state |pij >, when the decision is made
to realize this prospect, ensures that the individual will in general keep his/her decision, whatever
it is, when probed a second time sufficiently shortly after the first decision so that the strategic
state of mind, realized just after the projection, has not had time yet to evolve appreciably.
Definition 20. Optimal prospect
The prospect pi∗ is called optimal if and only if its probability is the largest among the
probabilities of all prospects from the considered prospect set L,
p(pi∗) = max
j
p(pij) (pij ∈ L) . (28)
12
In QDT, the concept of an optimal decision is replaced by a probabilistic decision, when the
prospect, which makes the probability p(pij) given by (26) maximal, is the one which corresponds
best to the given strategic state of mind of the decision maker. In that sense, the prospect
which makes p(pij) maximal can be called “optimal with respect to the strategic state of mind”.
Using the mapping between the subjective probabilities and the frequentist probabilities observed
on ensembles of individuals, the prospect that makes p(pij) maximal will be chosen by more
individuals than any other prospect, in the limit of large population sampling sizes. However,
other less probable prospects will also be chosen by some smaller subsets of the population.
Remark 1. Entangled decision making
As is explained above, a prospect state |pij > does not have in general the form of the product
(17), which means that it is entangled. The strategic state |ψs > can also be entangled. Therefore,
the prospect probability p(pij), in general, cannot be reduced to a product of terms, but has a
more complicated structure, as will be shown below. In other words, the decision making process
is naturally entangled.
Consider the example of Section 2 of the specific prospect state (20) associated with the two
intentions “to get married” and “to become rich”. And suppose that A does not like gangsters,
so that it is impossible to marry A and at the same time being a gangster. This implies that
the prospect-representation AG cannot be realized, hence c12 = 0. Assume that B dreams of
becoming rich as fast as possible, and a gangster spouse is much more luring for B than a dull
person working hard, which implies that c21 = 0. In this situation, the prospect state (20) reduces
to the entangled Bell state c11|AW > +c22|BG >. A decision performed under these conditions,
resulting in an entangled state, is entangled.
Remark 2. Noncommutativity of subsequent decisions
There exist numerous real-life examples when decision makers fail to follow their plans and
change their mind simply because they experience different outcomes on which their intended
plans were based. This change of plans after experiencing particular outcomes is the effect known
as dynamic inconsistency (Frederick et al., 2002; Barkan et al., 2005; Yukalov and Sornette, 2009).
In our language, this is a simple consequence of the non-commutativity of subsequent decisions,
resulting from entanglement between intention representations and caused by the existence of
intention interference.
3 Prospect Interference
As soon as one accepts the description of decision making, which invokes the mathematical tech-
niques of quantum theory as is suggested by Bohr (1929, 1933, 1937, 1961), one inevitably meets
the effects of interference. The possible occurrence of interference in the problems of decision
making has been mentioned before on formal grounds (see, e.g., Busemeyer et al., 2006). How-
ever, no general theory has been suggested, which would explain why and when such effects
would appear, how to predict them, and how to give a quantitative analysis of them. In our
approach, interference in decision making arises only when one takes a decision involving com-
posite prospects. The corresponding mathematical treatment of these interferences within QDT
is presented in the following subsections.
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3.1 Illustration of Interference in Decision Making
As an illustration, let us consider the following situation of two intentions, “to get a friend” and
“to become rich”. Let the former intention have two representations “to get the friend A” and
“to get the friend B”. And let the second intention also have two representations, “to become
rich by working hard” and “to become rich by being a gangster”. The corresponding strategic
mind state is given by Eq. (12), with the evident notation for the basic states |en > and the
coefficients cij given by the identities
c11 ≡ cA(W ) , c12 ≡ cA(G) , c21 ≡ cB(W ) , c22 ≡ cB(G) .
Suppose that one does not wish to choose between these two friends in an exclusive manner,
but one hesitates of being a friend to A as well as B, with the appropriate weights. This means
that one deliberates between the intention representations A and B, while the way of life, either
to work hard or to become a gangster, has not yet been decided.
The corresponding composite prospects
piA = A(W +G) , piB = B(W +G) (29)
are characterized by the prospect states
|piA > = a1|AW > +a2|AG > , |piB > = b1|BW > +b2|BG > . (30)
The coefficients of the prospect states define the weights corresponding to the intended actions,
among which the choice is yet to be made. One should not confuse the intended actions with
the actions that have already been realized. One can perfectly deliberate between keeping this
or that friend, in the same way, as one would think about marrying A or B in another example
above. This means that the choice has not yet been made. And before it is made, there exist
deliberations involving stronger or weaker intentions to both possibilities. Of course, one cannot
marry both (at least in most Christian communities). But before marriage, there can exist the
dilemma between choosing this or that individual.
Calculating the scalar products
< piA|ψs > = a
∗
1
c11 + a
∗
2
c12 , < piB|ψs > = b
∗
1
c21 + b
∗
2
c22 ,
we find the prospect probabilities
p(piA) = |a
∗
1
c11 + a
∗
2
c12|
2 , p(piB) = |b
∗
1
c21 + b
∗
2
c22|
2 . (31)
Recall that the prospects are characterized by vectors pertaining to the space of mind M,
which are not necessarily normalized to one or orthogonal to each other. The main constraint is
that the total set of prospect states L = {|pij >} be such that the related probabilities
p(pij) ≡ | < pij |ψs > |
2
be normalized to one, according to the normalization condition (27).
The probabilities (31) can be rewritten in another form by introducing the partial probabilities
p(AW ) ≡ |a1c11|
2 , p(AG) ≡ |a2c12|
2 ,
p(BW ) ≡ |b1c21|
2 , p(BG) ≡ |b2c22|
2 , (32)
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and the interference terms
q(piA) ≡ 2Re (a
∗
1
c11a2c
∗
12
) , q(piB) ≡ 2Re (b
∗
1
c21b2c
∗
22
) . (33)
Then the probabilities (31) become
p(piA) = p(AW ) + p(AG) + q(piA) , p(piB) = p(BW ) + p(BG) + q(piB) . (34)
Let us define the uncertainty angles
∆(piA) ≡ arg (a
∗
1
c11a2c
∗
12
) , ∆(piB) ≡ arg (b
∗
1
c21b2c
∗
22
) (35)
and the uncertainty factors
ϕ(piA) ≡ cos∆(piA) , ϕ(piB) ≡ cos∆(piB) . (36)
Using these, the interference terms (33) take the form
q(piA) = 2ϕ(piA)
√
p(AW )p(AG) , q(piB) = 2ϕ(piB)
√
p(BW )p(BG) . (37)
The interference terms characterize the existence of deliberations between the decisions of choos-
ing a friend and, at the same time, a type of work.
This example illustrates the observation that the phenomenon of decision interference ap-
pears when one considers a composite entangled prospect with several intention representations
assumed to be realized simultaneously. Thus, we can state that interference in decision making
appears when one decides about a composite entangled prospect.
For the above example of decision making in the case of two intentions, “to get a friend”
and “to be rich”, the appearance of the interference can be understood as follows. In real life, it
is too problematic, and practically impossible, to become a very close friend to several persons
simultaneously, since conflict of interests often arises between the friends. For instance, doing
a friendly action to one friend may upset or even harm another friend. Any decision making,
involving mutual correlations between two persons, necessarily requires taking into account their
sometimes conflicting interests. This is, actually, one of the origins of the interference in decision
making. Another powerful origin of intention interference is the existence of emotions, as will be
discussed in the following sections.
3.2 Conditions for the Presence of Interference
The situations for which intention interferences cannot appear can be classified into two cases,
which are examined below. From this classification, we conclude that the necessary conditions
for the appearance of intention interferences are that the dimensionality of mind should be not
lower than two and that there should be some uncertainty in the considered prospect. These
conditions imply that the considered prospect can be entangled.
Case 1. One-dimensional mind
Suppose there are many intentions {Ai}, enumerated by the index i = 1, 2, . . ., whose number
can be arbitrary. But each intention possesses only a single representation |Ai >. Hence, the
dimension of “mind” is dim(M) = 1. Only a single basic vector exists:
|A1A2 . . . > = ⊗i |Ai > .
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In this one-dimensional mind, all prospect states are disentangled, being of the type
|ψ >= c |A1A2 . . . > (|c| = 1) .
Therefore, only one probability exists:
p = | < A1A2 . . . |ψ > |
2 = 1 .
Thus, despite the possible large number of arbitrary intentions, they do not interfere, since
each of them has just one representation. There can be no intention interference in one-
dimensional mind.
Case 2. Absence of uncertainty
Another important condition for the appearance of intention interference is the existence of
uncertainty. To understand this statement, let us consider a given mind with a large dimension-
ality dim(M) > 1, characterized by a strategic state |ψs >. Let us analyze a certain prospect
with the state
|pij >= cj|ψs > (|cj| = 1) .
Then, the corresponding prospect probability is
p(pij) = | < pij |ψs > |
2 = 1 ,
and no interference can arise.
Thus, the necessary conditions for the intention interference are the existence of uncertainty
and the dimensionality of mind not lower than 2.
3.3 Interference Alternation
Let us consider two intentions, one composing a set {Ai} of M1 representations and another
one forming a set {Xj} of M2 representations. The total family of intention representations is
therefore
{Ai, Xj| i = 1, 2, . . . ,M1; j = 1, 2, . . . ,M2} . (38)
The prospect basis is the set {|AiXj >}. The strategic state of mind can be written as an
expansion over this basis,
|ψs >=
∑
ij
cij|AiXj > , (39)
with the coefficients satisfying the normalization
∑
ij
|cij|
2 = 1 . (40)
Let us assume that we are mainly interested in the representation set {Ai}, while the repre-
sentations from the set {Xj} are treated as additional. A prospect pii ≡ AiX , where X =
⋃
iXi,
which is formed of a fixed intention representation Ai, and which can be realized under the
occurrence of any of the representations Xi, corresponds to the prospect state
|pii >=
∑
j
aij |AiXj > . (41)
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The probability of realizing the considered prospect pii is
p(pii) ≡ | < pii|ψs > |
2 , (42)
according to definition (26).
Following the above formalism, used for describing intention interferences, we use the notation
p(AiXj) ≡ |aijcij|
2 (43)
for the joint probability of Ai and Xj ; and we denote the interference terms as
qjk(pii) ≡ 2Re
(
a∗ijcijc
∗
ikaik
)
. (44)
Then, the probability of pii, given by Eq. (42), becomes
p(pii) =
∑
j
p(AiXj) +
∑
j<k
qjk(pii) . (45)
The interference terms appear due to the existence of uncertainty. Therefore, we may define
the uncertainty angles
∆jk(pii) (46)
and the uncertainty factors
ϕjk(pii) ≡ cos∆jk(pii) . (47)
Then, the interference terms (44) take the form
qjk(pii) = 2ϕjk(pii)
√
p(AiXj) p(AiXk) . (48)
It is convenient to define the sum of the interference terms
q(pii) ≡
∑
j<k
qjk(pii) . (49)
This allows us to rewrite the prospect probability (45) as
p(pii) =
∑
j
p(AiXj) + q(pii) . (50)
The joint and conditional probabilities are related in the standard way
p(AiXj) = p(Ai|Xj)p(Xj) . (51)
In view of the normalization condition (27), we have
∑
i p(pii) = 1, which means that the
family of intended actions (38) is such that at least one of the representations from the set {Ai}
has to be certainly realized. We also assume that at least one of the representations from the set
{Xj} necessarily happens, that is, ∑
j
p(Xj) = 1 . (52)
Along with these conditions, we keep in mind that at least one of the representations from the
set {Ai} must be realized for each given Xj, which implies that∑
i
p(Ai|Xj) = 1 . (53)
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Then we see that
∑
i q(AiX) = 0.
By introducing the prospect utility factor
f(pii) ≡
∑
j
p(AiXj) , (54)
conditions (52) and (53) can be combined in one normalization condition
∑
j
f(pij) = 1 . (55)
The above consideration can be generalized into the following statement.
Theorem 1. Interference alternation: The process of decision making, associated with
the probabilities p(pij) of the prospects pij ∈ L, occurring under the normalization conditions
(27) and (55), is characterized by alternating interference terms, such that the total interference
vanishes, which implies the property of interference alternation
∑
j
q(pij) = 0 . (56)
Proof: From the above definitions, it follows that the prospect probability has the form
p(pij) = f(pij) + q(pij) . (57)
From here, taking into account the normalization conditions (27) and (55), we get the alternation
property (56).
Equality (56) shows that, if at least one of the terms is non-zero, some of the interference terms
are necessarily negative and some are necessarily positive. Therefore, some of the probabilities
are depressed, while others are enhanced. This alternation of the interference terms will be shown
below to be a pivotal feature providing a clear explanation of the disjunction effect. It is worth
emphasizing that the violation of the sure-thing principle, resulting in the disjunction effect, will
be shown not to be due simply to the existence of interferences as such, but more precisely to
the interference alternation.
For instance, the depression of some probabilities can be associated with uncertainty aversion,
which makes less probable an action under uncertain conditions. In contrast, the probability
of other intentions, containing less or no uncertainty, will be enhanced by positive interference
terms. This interference alternation is of crucial importance for the correct description of decision
making, without which the known paradoxes cannot be explained.
4 Interference Quarter Law
In agreement with the form (57), the prospect probability p(pij) is the sum of two terms, the
utility factor f(pij) and the interference term q(pij). The first term defines the prospect utility for
the decision maker. The second term characterizes the prospect attractiveness for this decision
maker, or a subjectively defined prospect quality. Therefore the quantity q(pij) can be called the
attraction factor or quality factor. As has been stressed several times throughout the paper, this
reflects the fact that the interference terms are embodying subjective feelings and emotions of
the decision maker.
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The appearance of the interference terms is the consequence of the use of quantum-theoretical
techniques for describing the process of decision making. However, the possible occurrence of
interference as such does not yet provide an explanation of paradoxical effects in human decision
making. If we would simply postulate the existence of the interference terms and would fit them
on the basis of some particular experiments, this would have no scientific value. Our approach
may acquire the status of a theory if (i) it explains the conditions under which the interference
terms appear, (ii) it delineates their underlying origin and (iii) it provides a procedure, even
approximate, for their quantitative evaluation. The following proceeds to demonstrate these
three points.
4.1 Aggregate Nature of Quantum Decision Theory
In the previous sections, we uncovered two important properties of the interference terms. First of
all, we showed that these terms arise only when the considered prospects are composite. Second,
we derived the theorem of interference alternation (Theorem 1). These properties clarify the
conditions under which interference can arise. But they are not yet sufficient for estimating the
values of the interference terms.
Strictly speaking, being defined to reflect subjective factors embodying subconscious feelings,
emotions, and biases, the interference terms are contextual. This means that the values of q
can be different for different decision makers. Moreover, they can be different for the same
decision maker at different times. These features seem to be natural when one keeps in mind real
humans, whose decisions are usually different, even under identical conditions. It is also known
that the same decision maker can vary his/her decisions at different times and under different
circumstances. But focusing solely on the contextual character of the interference terms gives
the wrong impression of a lack of predictive power of the approach which would make it rather
meaningless.
Fortunately, there is a way around the problem of contextuality, based on the fact that QDT
has been constructed as a probabilistic theory, with the probabilities interpreted in the frequentist
sense. This is equivalent to saying that QDT is a theory of the aggregate behavior of a population.
In other words, the predictions of the theory are statistical statements concerning the population
of individualistic behaviors, namely QDT provides the probability for a given individual to take
this or that decision interpreted in the sense of the fraction of individuals taking these decisions.
Keeping in mind this aggregate nature of QDT, there is no need to discuss the specific values
of the factor q appropriate to particular decision makers. But it is necessary to evaluate typical,
or expected values of q, corresponding to an ensemble of decision makers under given conditions.
In the following subsections, we show how this can be done. Knowing the expected value of q
makes it possible to predict the typical behavior of decision makers.
4.2 Binary Prospect Set
For concreteness, let us consider the case of two prospects. Suppose, one deliberates between
the intended actions A and B, under an additional intention with two modes, X = X1 +X2. So
that, one chooses between two composite prospects
piA ≡ AX piB = BX . (58)
The interference terms (48) can be rewritten as
q(piA) = 2ϕ(piA)
√
p(A|X1)p(X1)p(A|X2)p(X2) ,
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q(piB) = 2ϕ(piB)
√
p(B|X1)p(X1)p(B|X2)p(X2) . (59)
The interference-alternation theorem (Theorem 1), which leads to (56), implies that
|q(piA)| = |q(piB)| , (60)
and
sign[ϕ(piA)] = −sign[ϕ(piB)] . (61)
This defines the relation between the uncertainty factors.
A fundamental well-documented characteristic of human beings is their aversion to uncer-
tainty, i.e., the preference for known risks over unknown risks (Epstein, 1999). As a consequence,
the propensity/utility (and therefore the probability) to act under larger uncertainty is smaller
than under smaller uncertainty. Mechanically, this implies that it is possible to specify the sign
of the uncertainty factors yielding (61).
To find the amplitudes of the uncertainty factors, we may proceed as follows. By the definition
of these factors, we have
|ϕ(piA)| ∈ [0, 1] , |ϕ(piB)| ∈ [0, 1] . (62)
Without any other information, the simplest prior is to assume a uniform distribution of the
absolute values of the uncertainty factors in the interval [0, 1], so that their expected values are
respectively
|ϕ(piA)| = |ϕ(piB)| =
1
2
. (63)
Choosing in that way the average values of the uncertainty factors is equivalent to using a rep-
resentative agent, while the general approach is taking into account a pre-existing heterogeneity.
That is, the values (63) should be treated as estimates for the expected uncertainty factors,
corresponding to these factors averaged with the uniform distribution over the large number of
agents.
To complete the calculation of q(piA) and of q(piB), given by (59), we also assume the non-
informative uniform prior for all probabilities appearing below the square-roots, so that their
expected values are all 1/2, since they vary between 0 and 1. Using these in Eq. (59) results in
the interference-quarter law
|q(piA)| = |q(piB)| =
1
4
, (64)
valid for the four-dimensional mind composed of two intentions with two representations each.
4.3 Expected Value of Interference Terms
In the previous subsection, we have shown that, in the case of a binary prospect set, the magnitude
of the interference term can be estimated by the value 1/4. Now, we extend this result by
demonstrating that the expected value of the interference-term magnitude can be estimated as
1/4 for an arbitrary prospect, under quite general conditions.
The interference term, or the attraction factor, q(pij), is defined by emotions, subconscious
feelings, and other hidden variables. Strictly speaking, it is contextual, depending on a particular
decision maker at a given time. For an ensemble of decision makers, the interference term can be
treated as a random variable in the interval [−1, 1]. That is, the modulus |q(pij)| of the attraction
factor, is a random variable in the interval [0, 1].
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Let the distribution of this random variable be ρ(ξ), with the variable ξ in the interval [0, 1].
The expectation value of the modulus of the attraction factor is
q ≡
∫
1
0
ξρ(ξ) dξ . (65)
By its definition, the distribution is normalized as
∫
1
0
ρ(ξ) dξ = 1 . (66)
Since the exact form of this distribution is not known, we can consider two limiting cases.
One limiting case is provided by a distribution concentrated in the center, which is described by
the Dirac delta function δ(ξ), so that the distribution is
ρ1(ξ) = 2δ(ξ) . (67)
Recall that the delta function is defined through the integral
∫ a
−a
h(ξ)δ(ξ) dξ = h(0) ,
where h(ξ) is any smooth function of ξ and a > 0. The delta distribution is normalized,
∫
1
0
ρ1(ξ) dξ = 1 .
Another limiting case is the uniform distribution in the interval [0, 1], which is described by
the form
ρ2(ξ) = Θ(1− ξ) , (68)
expressed through the unit-step function
Θ(ξ) ≡
{
0, ξ < 0
1, ξ > 0.
The uniform distribution is also normalized,
∫
1
0
ρ2(ξ) dξ = 1 .
Knowing only two limiting cases, we may model the unknown distribution ρ(ξ) by the average
of these two limiting cases:
ρ(ξ) =
1
2
[ρ1(ξ) + ρ2(ξ)] , (69)
which yields
ρ(ξ) = δ(ξ) +
1
2
Θ(1− ξ) . (70)
This distribution, by construction, is normalized as in (66).
Calculating the expected value (65), we obtain
q ≡
∫
1
0
ξρ(ξ) dξ =
1
4
. (71)
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Thus, the expected value of the modulus of the interference term is again given by the quarter
law: q = 1/4. This allows us to quantitatively estimate the influence of emotions in decision
making and to predict, on the aggregate level, the average behavior of typical decision makers.
It is appropriate to remember that it was Bohr (1929, 1933, 1937, 1961) who advocated
throughout all his life the idea that mental processes do bear close analogies with quantum
processes. The analogies should be understood here in the sense of their similar theoretical
description, but not necessarily in the sense of being physiologically equivalent. Since interference
is one of the most striking characteristic features of quantum processes, the analogy suggests that
it should also arise in mental processes as well. The existence of interference in decision making
disturbs the classical additivity of probabilities. Indeed, we take as an evidence of this the
nonadditivity of probabilities in psychology which has been repeatedly observed (Tversky and
Koehler, 1994; Fox et al., 1996; Rottenstreich and Tversky, 1997), although it has not been
connected with interference.
It is also important to stress that the mere existence of interference as such does not allow
one to make any reasonable predictions in analyzing human decision making. It is necessary
to derive the main general properties of interference in order to make this notion operationally
meaningful. These general properties that we have derived are:
• Interference appears only for composite prospects under the presence of uncertainty.
• Interference terms satisfy the alternation condition formalized in Theorem 1.
• The expected value of the interference-term magnitude can be estimated by the quarter
law.
Equipped with the knowledge of these properties, it becomes possible to analyze the influence
of interference on human decision making and explain the corresponding paradoxical effects.
5 Disjunction Effect
The disjunction effect was first specified by Savage (1954) as a violation of the “sure-thing
principle”, which can be formulated as follows (Savage, 1954): if the alternative A is preferred
to the alternative B, when an event X1 occurs, and it is also preferred to B, when an event X2
occurs, then A should be preferred to B, when it is not known which of the events, either X1 or
X2, has occurred.
5.1 Sure-Thing Principle
For the purpose of self-consistency, let us recall the relationship between the sure-thing principle
and classical probability theory. Let us consider a field of events {A,B,Xj|j = 1, 2, . . .} equipped
with the classical probability measures (Feller, 1970). We denote the classical probability of an
event A by the capital letter P (A) in order to distinguish it from the probability p(A) defined
in the previous sections by means of quantum rules. We shall denote, as usual, the conditional
probability of A under the knowledge of Xj by P (A|Xj) and the joint probability of A and Xj,
by P (AXj). We assume that at least one of the events Xj from the set {Xj} certainly happens,
which implies that ∑
j
P (Xj) = 1 . (72)
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The probability of A, when Xj is not specified, that is, when at least one of Xj happens, is
denoted by P (AX), with X =
⋃
j Xj. The same notations are applied to B. Following the
common reasoning, we understand the statement “A is preferred to B” as meaning P (A) > P (B).
Then the following theorem is valid.
Theorem 2: If for all j = 1, 2, . . . one has
P (A|Xj) > P (B|Xj) , (73)
then
P (AX) > P (BX) . (74)
Proof. Under condition X =
⋃
j Xj, one has
P (AX) =
∑
j
P (AXj) =
∑
j
P (A|Xj)P (Xj) (75)
and
P (BX) =
∑
j
P (BXj) =
∑
j
P (B|Xj)P (Xj) . (76)
From Eqs. (75) and (76), under assumption (73), inequality (74) follows immediately.
The above proposition is the theorem of classical probability theory. Savage (1954) proposed
to use it as a normative statement on how human beings make consistent decisions under uncer-
tainty. As such, it is no more a theorem but a testable assumption about human behavior. In
other words, empirical tests showing that humans fail to obey the sure-thing principle must be
interpreted as a failure of humans to abide to the rules of classical probability theory.
5.2 Examples Illustrating the Disjunction Effect
Thus, according to standard classical probability theory which is held by most statisticians as
the only rigorous mathematical description of risks, and therefore as the normative guideline
describing rational human decision making, the sure-thing principle should be always verified in
empirical tests involving real human beings. However, numerous violations of this principle have
been investigated empirically (Savage, 1954; Tversky and Shafir, 1992; Croson, 1999; Lambdin
and Burdsal, 2007; Li et al., 2007). In order to be more specific, let us briefly outline some
examples of the violation of the sure-thing principle, referred to as the disjunction effect.
Example 1. To gamble or not to gamble?
A typical setup for illustrating the disjunction effect is a two-step gamble (Tversky and Shafir,
1992). Suppose that a group of people accepted a gamble, in which the player can either win an
amount of money (action X1) or lose an amount (action X2). After one gamble, the participants
are invited to gamble the second time, being free to either accept the second gamble (A) or to
refuse it (B). Experiments by Tversky and Shafir (1992) showed that the majority of people
accept the second gamble when they know the result of the first one, in any case, whether
they won or lost in the previous gamble. In the language of conditional probability theory, this
translates into the fact that people act as if P (A|X1) is larger than P (B|X1) and P (A|X2) is
larger than P (B|X2) as in Eq. (73). At the same time, it turns out that the majority refuses
to gamble the second time when the outcome of the first gamble is not known. The second
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empirical fact implies that people act as if P (BX) overweighs P (AX), in blatant contradiction
with inequality (74) which should hold according to the theorem resulting from (73). Thus, the
majority accepted the second gamble after having won or lost in the first gamble, but only a
minority accepted the second gamble when the outcome of the first gamble was unknown to
them. This provides an unambiguous violation of the Savage sure-thing principle.
Example 2. To buy or not to buy?
Another example, studied by Tversky and Shafir (1992), had to do with a group of students
who reported their preferences about buying a nonrefundable vacation, following a tough univer-
sity test. They could pass the exam (X1) or fail (X2). The students had to decide whether they
would go on vacation (A) or abstain (B). It turned out that the majority of students purchased
the vacation when they passed the exam as well as when they had failed, so that condition (73)
was valid. However, only a minority of participants purchased the vacation when they did not
know the results of the examination. Hence, inequality (74) was violated, demonstrating again
the disjunction effect.
Example 3. To sell or not to sell?
The stock market example, analysed by Shafir and Tversky (1992), is a particularly telling
one, involving a deliberation taking into account a future event, and not a past one as in the
two previous cases. Consider the USA presidential election, when either a Republican wins (X1)
or a Democrat wins (X2). On the eve of the election, market players can either sell certain
stocks from their portfolio (A) or hold them (B). It is known that a majority of people would be
inclined to sell their stocks, if they would know who wins, regardless of whether the Republican
or Democrat candidate wins the upcoming election. This is because people expect the market
to fall after the elections. Hence, condition (73) is again valid. At the same time, a great many
people do not sell their stocks before knowing who really won the election, thus contradicting
the sure-thing principle and inequality (74). Thus, investors could have sold their stocks before
the election at a higher price, but, obeying the disjunction effect, they were waiting until after
the election, thereby selling at a lower price after stocks have fallen. Many market analysts
believe that this is precisely what happened after the 1988 presidential election, when George
Bush defeated Michael Dukakis.
There are plenty of other more or less complicated examples of the disjunction effect (Savage,
1954; Tversky and Shafir, 1992; Shafir and Tversky, 1992; Shafir et al., 1993; Shafir, 1994; Croson,
1999; Lambdin and Burdsal, 2007). The common necessary conditions for the disjunction effect
to arise are as follows. First, there should be several events, each characterized by several
alternatives, as in the two-step gambles. Second, there should necessarily exist some uncertainty,
whether with respect to the past, as in Examples 1 and 2, or with respect to the future, as in
Example 3.
Several ways of interpreting the disjunction effect have been analyzed. Here, we do not discuss
the interpretations based on the existence of some biases, such as the gender bias, or which invoke
the notion of decision complexity, which have already been convincingly ruled out (Croson, 1999;
Ku¨hberger et al., 2001). We describe the reason-based explanation which appears to enjoy a
wide-spread following and discuss its limits before turning to the view point offered by QDT.
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5.3 Reason-Based Analysis
The dominant approach for explaining the disjunction effect is the reason-based analysis of de-
cision making (Tversky and Shafir, 1992; Shafir and Tversky, 1992; Shafir et al., 1993; Shafir,
1994; Croson, 1999). This approach explains choice in terms of the balance between reasoning
for and against the various alternatives. The basic intuition is that when outcomes are known,
a decision maker may easily come up with a definitive reason for choosing an option. However,
in case of uncertainty, when the outcomes are not known, people may lack a clear reason for
choosing an option and consequently they abstain and make an irrational choice.
From our perspective, the weakness of the reason-based analysis is that the notion of “reason”
is too vague and subjective. Reasons are not only impossible to quantify, but it is difficult, if
possible at all, to give a qualitative definition of what they are.
Consider Example 1 “to gamble or not to gamble?” Suppose you have already won at the first
step. Then, you can rationalize that gambling a second time is not very risky: if you now lose,
this loss will be balanced by the first win (on which you were not counting anyway, so that you
may actually treat it differently from the rest of your wealth, according to the so-called “mental
accounting” effect), and if you win again, your profit will be doubled. Thus, you have a “reason”
to justify the attractiveness of the second gamble. But, it seems equally justified to consider the
alternative “reason”: if you have won once, winning the second time may seem less probable (the
so-called gambler’s fallacy), and if you lose, you will keep nothing of your previous gain. This
line of reasoning justifies to keep what you already got and to forgo the second gamble. Suppose
now you have lost in the first gamble and know it. A first reasoning would be that the second
gamble offers a possibility of getting out of the loss, which provides a reason for accepting the
second gamble. However, you may also think that the win is not guaranteed, and your situation
could actually worsen, if you lose again. Therefore, this makes it more reasonable not to risk so
much and to refrain from the new gamble.
Consider now the situation where you are kept ignorant of whether you have won or lost in
the first gamble. Then, you may think that there is no reason and therefore no motivation for
accepting the second gamble, which is the standard reason-based explanation. But, one could
argue that it would be even more logical if you would think as follows: Okay, I do not know what
has happened in the first gamble. So, why should I care about it? Why don’t I try again my
luck? Certainly, there is a clear reason for gambling that could propagate the drive to gamble
the second time.
This discussion is not pretending to demonstrate anything other than that the reason-based
explanation is purely ad-hoc, with no real explanatory power; it can be considered in a sense
as a reformulation of the disjunction fallacy. It is possible to multiply the number of examples
demonstrating the existence of quite “reasonable” justifications for doing something as well as a
reason for just doing the opposite. It seems to us that the notion of “reason” is not well defined
and one can always invent in this way a justification for anything. Thus, we propose that the
disjunction effect has no direct relation to reasoning. In the following section, we suggest another
explanation of this effect based on QDT, specifically the negative interference between the two
uncertain outcomes resulting from an aversion to uncertainty (uncertainty-aversion principle),
which provides a quantitative testable prediction.
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5.4 Quantitative Analysis within Quantum Decision Theory
The possibility of connecting the violation of the sure-thing principle with the occurrence of
interference has been mentioned in several articles (see, e.g., Busemeyer et al. (2006). But these
attempts were just ad hoc assumptions not based on a self-consistent theory. Our explanation
of the disjunction effect differs from these attempts in several aspects. First, we consider the
disjunction effect as just one of several possible effects in the frame of the general theory. The
explanation is based on the theorem of interference alternation, which has never been mentioned,
but without which no explanation can be complete and self-consistent. We stress the importance
of the uncertainty-aversion principle. Also, we offer a quantitative estimate for the effect, which
is principally new.
5.4.1 Application to Examples of the Disjunction Effect
Let us discuss the two first examples illustrating the disjunction effect, in which the prospect
consists of two intentions with two representations each. One intention “to decide about an
action” has the representations “to act” (A) and “not to act” (B). The second intention “to
know the results” (or “to have information”) has also two representations. One (X1) can be
termed “to learn about the win” (gamble won, exam passed), the other (X2) can be called “to
learn about the loss” (gamble lost, exam failed). Given the numbers of these representations
M1 = 2 and M2 = 2, the dimension of mind is dim(M) =M1M2 = 4.
For the considered cases, the general set of equations for the prospect probabilities reduces
to two equations
p(AX) = p(AX1) + p(AX2) + q(AX) ,
p(BX) = p(BX1) + p(BX2) + q(BX) , (77)
in which X =
⋃
iXi and the interference terms are
q(AX) = 2ϕ(AX)
√
p(AX1) p(AX2) ,
p(BX) = 2ϕ(BX)
√
p(BX1) p(BX2) . (78)
Of course, Eqs. (77) and (78) could be postulated, but then it would not be clear where they come
from. In QDT, these equations appear naturally. Here ϕ(AX) and ϕ(BX) are the uncertainty
factors defined in (47). The normalization conditions become
p(AX) + p(BX) = 1 , p(X1) + p(X2) = 1 , (79)
with conditions (53) being
p(A|X1) + p(B|X1) = 1 , p(A|X2) + p(B|X2) = 1 . (80)
The uncertainty factors can be rewritten as
ϕ(AX) =
q(AX)
2
√
p(AX1)p(AX2)
, ϕ(BX) =
q(BX)
2
√
p(BX1)p(BX2)
, (81)
with the interference terms being
q(AX) = p(AX)− p(AX1)− p(AX2) , q(BX) = p(BX)− p(BX1)− p(BX2) . (82)
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The principal point is the condition of interference alternation (Theorem 1), which now reads
q(AX) + q(BX) = 0 . (83)
Without this condition (83), the system of equations for the probabilities would be incomplete,
and the disjunction effect could not be explained in principle.
In the goal of explaining the disjunction effect, it is not sufficient to merely state that some
type of interference is present. It is necessary to determine (quantitatively) why the probability
of acting is suppressed, while that of remaining passive is enhanced. Our aim is to evaluate
the expected size and sign of the interference terms q(AX) (for acting under uncertainty) and
q(BX) (for remaining inactive under uncertainty). Obviously, it is an illusion to search for a
universal value that everybody would strictly use. Different experiments with different people
have indeed demonstrated a significant heterogeneity among people, so that, in the language
of QDT, this means that the values of the interference terms can fluctuate from individual to
individual. A general statement should here refer to the behavior of a sufficiently large ensemble
of people, allowing us to map the observed frequentist distribution of decisions to the predicted
QDT probabilities.
5.4.2 Alternation Theorem and Interference-Quarter Law
Now we shall employ the alternation theorem and the quarter law for describing the disjunction
effect. The interference terms are given in (59). The interference-alternation theorem (Theorem
1) yields Eqs. (60) and (61). Hence, in the case where p(A|Xj) > p(B|Xj), which is characteristic
of the examples illustrating the disjunction effect, one must have the uncertainty factors which
exhibit the opposite property, |ϕ(AX)| < |ϕ(BX)|, so as to compensate the former inequality
to ensure the validity of equality (60) for the absolute values of the interference terms. The
expected values of the latter can be evaluated from the Quarter Law as 1/4.
The next step is to determine the sign of ϕ(AX) and, thus, of ϕ(BX)), from (61) and their
typical amplitudes |ϕ(AX)| and |ϕ(BX)|. A fundamental well-documented characteristic of
human beings is their aversion to uncertainty, i.e., the preference for known risks over unknown
risks (Epstein, 1999). As a consequence, the propensity/utility and, therefore, the probability to
act under larger uncertainty is smaller than under smaller uncertainty. Mechanically, this implies
that it is possible to specify the sign of the uncertainty factors, yielding
sign[ϕ(AX)] = −sign[ϕ(BX)] < 0 , (84)
since A (respectively B) refers to acting (respectively to remaining inactive).
As a consequence of (84) and also of their mathematical definition (47), the uncertainty
factors vary in the intervals
−1 ≤ ϕ(AX) ≤ 0 , 0 ≤ ϕ(BX) ≤ 1 . (85)
Invoking the interference-quarter law, we find the expected values of the interference terms
q(AX) = −0.25 , q(BX) = 0.25 . (86)
As a consequence, the probabilities for acting or for remaining inactive under uncertainty,
given by (77), can be evaluated as
p(AX) = p(AX1) + p(AX2)− 0.25 ,
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p(BX) = p(BX1) + p(BX2) + 0.25 . (87)
The influence of intention interference in the presence of uncertainty on the decision making
process at the basis of the disjunction effect can thus be estimated a priori. The sign of the effect
is controlled by the aversion to uncertainty exhibited by people (uncertainty-aversion principle).
The amplitude of the effect can be estimated, as shown above, from simple priors applied to the
mathematical structure of the QDT formulation.
5.4.3 Principle of Uncertainty Aversion
The above calculation implies that the disjunction effect can be interpreted as essentially an
emotional reaction associated with the aversion to uncertainty. An analogy can make the point:
it is widely recognized that uncertainty frightens living beings, whether humans or animals. It
is also well documented that fear paralyzes, as in the cartoon of the “rabbit syndrome,” when a
rabbit stays immobile in front of an approaching boa instead of running away. There are many
circumstantial evidences that uncertainty may frighten people as a boa frightens rabbits. Being
afraid of uncertainty, a majority of human beings may be hindered to act. In the presence of
uncertainty, they do not want to act, so that they refuse the second gamble, as in Example 1, or
forgo the purchase of a vacation, as in Example 2, or refrain from selling stocks, as in Example
3. Our analysis suggests that it is the aversion to uncertainty that paralyzes people and causes
the disjunction effect.
It has been reported that, if people, when confronting uncertainty paralyzing them against
acting, are presented with a detailed explanation of the possible outcomes, they then may change
their mind and decide to act, thus reducing the disjunction effect (Tversky and Shafir, 1992;
Croson, 1999). Thus, encouraging people to think by providing them additional explanations,
it is possible to influence their minds. In such a case, reasoning plays the role of a kind of
therapeutic treatment decreasing the aversion to uncertainty. This line of reasoning suggests
that it should be possible to decrease the aversion to uncertainty by other means, perhaps by
distracting people or by taking food, drink or drug injections. This provides the possibility to test
for the dependence of the strength of the disjunction effect with respect to various parameters
which may modulate the aversion response of individuals to uncertainty.
We should stress that our explanation departs fundamentally from the standard reason-based
rationalization of the disjunction effect summarized above. Rather than using what we perceive
is an hoc explanation, we anchor the disjunction effect on the very fundamental characteristic
of living beings, that of the aversion to uncertainty. This allows us to construct a robust and
parsimonious explanation. But this explanation arises only within QDT, because QDT allows
us to account for the complex emotional, often subconscious, feelings as well as the many un-
known states of nature that underlie decision making. Such unknown states, analogous to hidden
variables in quantum mechanics, are taken into account by the formalism of QDT through the in-
terference alternation effect, capturing mental processes by means of quantum-theory techniques.
5.4.4 Numerical Analysis of Disjunction-Effect Examples
Let us now turn to the examples described above and suggest their quantitative explanations.
Example 1. To gamble or not to gamble?
The statistics reported by Tversky and Shafir (1992) are
p(A|X1) = 0.69 , p(A|X2) = 0.59 , p(AX) = 0.36 .
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Then Eqs. (79) and (80) give
p(B|X1) = 0.31 , p(B|X2) = 0.41 , p(BX) = 0.64 .
Recall that the disjunction effect here is the violation of the sure-thing principle, so that, although
p(A|Xj) > p(B|Xj) for j = 1, 2, one observes nevertheless that p(AX) < p(BX). In the
experiment reported by Tversky and Shafir (1992), the probabilities for winning or for losing
were identical: p(X1) = p(X2) = 0.5. Then, using relation (51), we obtain
p(AX1) = 0.345 , p(AX2) = 0.295 , p(BX1) = 0.155 , p(BX2) = 0.205 .
For the interference terms, we find
q(AX) = −0.28 , q(BX) = 0.28 . (88)
The uncertainty factors (81) are therefore
ϕ(AX) = −0.439 , ϕ(BX) = 0.785 .
They are of opposite sign, in agreement with condition (83). The probability p(AX) of gambling
under uncertainty is suppressed by the negative interference term q(AX) < 0. Reciprocally, the
probability p(BX) of not gambling under uncertainty is enhanced by the positive interference
term q(BX) > 0. This results in the disjunction effect, when p(AX) < p(BX)).
It is important to stress that the observed amplitudes in (88) are close to the value 0.25
predicted by the interference-quarter law. They are, actually, undistinguishable from 0.25 within
the typical statistical error of 20% characterizing these experiments. That is, even not knowing
the results of the considered experiment, we are able to quantitatively predict the strength of the
disjunction effect.
Example 2. To buy or not to buy?
For the second example of the disjunction effect, the data, taken from Tversky and Shafir
(1992), read
p(A|X1) = 0.54 , p(A|X2) = 0.57 , p(AX) = 0.32 .
Following the same procedure as above, we get
p(B|X1) = 0.46 , p(B|X2) = 0.43 , p(BX) = 0.68 .
Given again that the two alternative outcomes are equiprobable, p(X1) = p(X2) = 0.5, we find
p(AX1) = 0.270 , p(AX2) = 0.285 , p(BX1) = 0.230 , p(BX2) = 0.215 .
For the interference terms, we obtain
q(AX) = −0.235 , q(BX) = 0.235 . (89)
The uncertainty factors are
ϕ(AX) = −0.424 , ϕ(BX) = 0.528 .
Again, the values obtained in (89) are close to those predicted by the interference-quarter law,
being undistinguishable from 0.25 within experimental accuracy.
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Because of the uncertainty aversion, the probability p(AX) of purchasing a vacation is sup-
pressed by the negative interference term q(AX) < 0. At the same time, the probability p(BX) of
not buying a vacation under uncertainty is enhanced by the positive interference term q(BX) > 0.
This alternation of interferences causes the disjunction effect, when p(AX) < p(BX). It is neces-
sary to stress it again that without this interference alternation no explanation of the disjunction
effect is possible in principle.
In the same way, our approach can be applied to any other situation related to the disjunction
effect associated with the violation of the sure-thing principle.
6 Conjunction Fallacy
The conjunction fallacy constitutes another example revealing that intuitive estimates of proba-
bility by human beings do not conform to the standard probability calculus. This effect was first
studied by Tversky and Kahneman (1980, 1983) and then discussed in many other works (see,
e.g., Morier and Borgida, 1984; Wells, 1985; Yates and Carlson, 1986; Shafir et al., 1990; Tentori
et al., 2004). Despite an extensive debate and numerous attempts to interpret this effect, there
seems to be no consensus on the origin of the conjunction fallacy (Tentori et al., 2004).
Here, we show that this effect finds a natural explanation in QDT. It is worth emphasizing
that we do not invent a special scheme for this particular effect, but we show that it is a natural
consequence of the general theory we have developed. In order to claim to explain the conjunction
fallacy in terms of an interference effect in a quantum description of probabilities, it is necessary
to derive the quantitative values of the interference terms, amplitudes and signs, as we have
done above for the examples illustrating the disjunction effect. This has never been done before.
Our QDT provides the necessary ingredients, in terms of the uncertainty-aversion principle, the
theorem on interference alternation, and the interference-quarter law. Only the establishment
of these general laws can provide an explanation of the conjunction fallacy, that can be taken
as a positive step towards validating QDT, according to the general methodology of validating
theories (Sornette et al., 2007). Finally, in our comparison with available experimental data, we
analyze a series of experiments and demonstrate that all their data substantiate the validity of
the general laws of the theory.
6.1 Individual versus Group Decisions
In order to be precise, it is necessary to distinguish the conjunction fallacy observed in the process
of decision making performed by separate individuals and by groups of decision makers. Group
decisions can be different from those of noninteracting individuals (Baron, 1998; Sheremeta and
Zhang, 2009). In particular, the conjunction fallacy, that has been documented for isolated
decision makers, practically disappears for decisions taken by groups of interacting individuals.
The violation rate characterizing the conjunction fallacy falls significantly when communication
between participants is allowed (Charness et al., 2008). The reduction of the strength of the
conjunction effect is due to the existence of social interactions. These social interactions play a
role analogous to the interaction between particles, which are known to lead to “decoherence” in
quantum systems. A study of the decoherence phenomenon in the present context is beyond the
scope of our paper, which focuses on the conjunction fallacy associated with separate individuals,
in absence of social interactions. This corresponds to the setup that was studied by Tversky and
Kahneman (1980, 1983).
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6.2 Conjunction Rule
Let us first briefly recall the conjunction rule of standard probability theory. Let us consider
an event A that can occur together with another one among several other events Xj, where
j = 1, 2, . . .. The probability of an event estimated within classical probability theory is again
denoted with the capital letter P (A), to distinguish it from the probability p(A) in our quantum
approach. According to standard probability theory (Feller, 1970), one has
P (AX) =
∑
j
P (AXj) , (90)
where X =
⋃
iXi. Since all terms in the sum (90) are positive, the conjunction rule tells us that
P (AX) ≥ P (AXj) (∀ j) . (91)
That is, the probability for the occurrence of the conjunction of two events is never larger than
the probability for the occurrence of a separate event.
6.3 Conjunction Error
Counterintuitively, humans rather systematically violate the conjunction rule (91), commonly
making statements such that
p(AX) < p(AXj) , (92)
for some j, which is termed the conjunction fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman, 1980; 1983). The
difference
ε(AXj) ≡ p(AXj)− p(AX) (93)
is called the conjunction error, which is positive under conditions in which the conjunction fallacy
is observed.
A typical situation is when people judge about a person, who can possess a characteristic
A and also some other characteristics Xj (which can be “possessing a trait” or “not having the
trait”, since not having a trait is also a characteristic), as in the oft-cited example of Tversky
and Kahneman (1980): “Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored
in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social
justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Which is more likely? (i) Linda is
a bank teller; (ii) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.” Most people
answer (ii) which is an example of the conjunction fallacy (92). Numerous other examples of the
fallacy are described in the literature (Tversky and Kahneman, 1980, 1983; Morier and Borgida,
1984; Wells, 1985; Yates and Carlson, 1986; Shafir et al., 1990; Tentori et al., 2004). It is
important to stress that this fallacy has been reliably and repeatedly documented, that it cannot
be explained by the ambiguity of the word “likely” used in the formulation of the question, and
that it appears to involve a failure to coordinate the logical structure of events in the presence
of chance (Tentori et al., 2004).
6.4 Conjunction Interference
Within QDT, the conjunction fallacy finds a simple and natural explanation. Let us consider
a typical situation of the fallacy, when one judges a person who may have a characteristic A,
treated as primary, and who may also possess, or not possess, another characteristic, labelled as
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secondary. Generally, the person could also be an object, a fact, or anything else, which could
combine several features. Translating this situation to the mathematical language of QDT, we see
that it involves two intentions. One intention, with just one representation, is “to decide whether
the object has the feature A.” The second intention “to decide about the secondary feature” has
two representations, when one decides whether “the object has the special characteristic” (X1)
or “the object does not have this characteristic” (X2).
For these definitions, and following the general scheme, we have
p(AX) = p(AX1) + p(AX2) + q(AX) = p(A|X1)p(X1) + p(A|X2)p(X2) + q(AX) (94)
where X =
⋃
iXi. This is a typical situation where a decision is taken under uncertainty. The
uncertainty-aversion principle imposes that the interference term q(AX) should be negative.
Taking the perspective of the representation X1, definition (93) together with Eq. (94) imply
that the conjunction error reads
ε(AX1) = |q(AX)| − p(AX2) . (95)
The condition for the conjunction fallacy to occur is that the error (95) be positive, which requires
that the interference term be sufficiently large, such that the conjunction-fallacy condition
|q(AX)| > p(AX2) (96)
be satisfied.
The QDT thus predicts that a person will make a decision exhibiting the conjunction fallacy
when (i) uncertainty is present and (ii) the interference term, which is negative by the uncertainty-
aversion principle, has a sufficiently large amplitude, according to condition (96).
6.5 Comparison with Experiments
For a quantitative analysis, we take the data from Shafir et al. (1990), who present one of the
most carefully accomplished and thoroughly discussed set of experiments. Shafir et al. questioned
large groups of students in the following way. The students were provided with booklets each
containing a brief description of a person. It was stated that the described person could have a
primary characteristic (A), and also another characteristic (X1) or its absence (X2).
In total, there were 28 experiments separated into two groups according to the conjunctive
category of the studied characteristics. In 14 cases, the features A and X1 were compatible with
each other, and in the other 14 cases, they were incompatible. The characteristics were treated
as compatible, when they were felt as closely related according to some traditional wisdom, for
instance, “woman teacher” (A) and “feminist” (X1). Another example of compatible features is
“chess player” (A) and “professor” (X1). Those characteristics that were not related by direct
logical connections were considered as incompatible, such as “bird watcher” (A) and “truck
driver” (X1) or “bicycle racer” (A) and “nurse” (X1).
In each of the 28 experiments, the students were asked to evaluate both the typicality and
the probability of A and AX1. Since normal people usually understand “typicality” just as a
synonym of probability, and vice versa, the predictions on typicality were equivalent to estimates
of probabilities. This amounts to considering only how the students estimated the probabil-
ity p(AX) that the considered person possesses the stated primary feature and the probability
p(AX1) that the person has both characteristics A and X1.
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An important quality of the experiments by Shafir et al. (1990) lies in the large number
of tests which were performed. Indeed, a given particular experiment is prone to exhibit a
significant amount of variability, randomness or “noise”. Not only the interrogated subjects
exhibited significant idiosyncratic differences, with diverse abilities, logic, and experience, but
in addition the questions were quite heterogeneous. Even the separation of characteristics into
two categories of compatible and incompatible pairs is, to some extent, arbitrary. Consequently,
no one particular case provides a sufficiently clear-cut conclusion on the existence or absence of
the conjunction fallacy. It is only by realizing a large number of interrogations, with a variety
of different questions, and by then averaging the results, that it is possible to make justified
conclusions on whether or not the conjunction fallacy exists. The set of experiments performed
by Shafir et al. (1990) well satisfies these requirements.
For the set of compatible pairs of characteristics, it turned out that the average probabilities
were p(AX) = 0.537 and p(AX1) = 0.567, with statistical errors of 20%. Hence, within this
accuracy, p(AX) and p(AX1) coincide and no conjunction fallacy arises for compatible charac-
teristics. From the view point of QDT, this is easily interpreted as due to the lack of uncertainty:
since the features A and X1 are similar to each other, one almost certainly yielding the other,
there is no uncertainty in deciding, hence, no interference, and, consequently, no conjunction
fallacy.
However, for the case of incompatible pairs of characteristics, the situation was found to be
drastically different. To analyse the related set of experiments, we follow the general scheme
of QDT, using the same notations as above. We have the prospect with two intentions, one
intention is to evaluate a primary feature (A) of the object, and another intention is to decide
whether at the same time the object possesses a secondary feature (X1) or does not possess it
(X2). Taking the data for p(Xj) and p(AX1) from Shafir et al. (1990), we calculate q(AX)
for each case separately and then average the results. In the calculations, we take into account
that the considered pairs of characteristics are incompatible with each other. The simplest
and most natural mathematical embodiment of the property of “incompatibility” is to take the
probabilities of possessing A, under the condition of either having or not having X1, as equal,
that is, p(A|Xj) = 0.5. For such a case of incompatible pairs of characteristics, Eq. (94) reduces
to
p(AX) =
1
2
+ q(AX) . (97)
The results, documenting the existence of the interference terms underlying the conjunction
fallacy, are presented in Table 1, which gives the abbreviated names for the object characteristics,
whose detailed description can be found in Shafir et al. (1990).
The average values of the different reported probabilities are
p(AX) = 0.22 , p(X1) = 0.692 , p(X2) = 0.308 ,
p(AX1) = 0.346 , p(AX2) = 0.154. (98)
One can observe that the interference terms fluctuate around a mean of −0.28, with a standard
deviation of ±0.06:
q(AX) = −0.28± 0.06 . (99)
There is a clear evidence of the conjunction fallacy, with the conjunction error (93) being
ε(AX1) = 0.126.
QDT interprets the conjunction effect as due to the uncertainty underlying the decision,
which leads to the appearance of the intention interferences. The interference of intentions is
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caused by the hesitation whether, under the given primary feature (A), the object possesses the
secondary feature (X1) or does not have it (X2). The term q(AX) is negative, reflecting the effect
of deciding under uncertainty, according to the uncertainty-aversion principle. Quantitatively,
we observe that the amplitude |q(AX)| is in agreement with the QDT interference-quarter law,
actually coinciding with 0.25 within the experimental accuracy.
6.6 Conjunction and Disjunction Effects
The QDT predicts that setups in which the conjunction fallacy occurs should also be accompanied
by the disjunction effect. To see this, let us extend slightly the previous decision problem by
allowing for two representations of the first intention. Concretely, this means that the intention,
related to the decision about the primary characteristic, has two representations: (i) “decide
about the object or person having or not the primary considered feature” (A), and (ii) “decide
to abstain from deciding about this feature” (B). This frames the problem in the context
previously analysed for the disjunction effect. The conjunction fallacy occurs when one considers
incompatible characteristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; Shafir et al., 1990), such that the
probabilities of deciding of having a conjunction (AXj) or of not guessing about it (BXj) are
close to each other, so that one can set
p(A|Xj) = p(B|Xj) (∀j) . (100)
The theorem on interference alternation (Theorem 1) implies that the interference term for being
passive under uncertainty is positive and we have
q(BX) = −q(AX) > 0 . (101)
Now, the probability p(BX) of deciding not to guess under uncertainty is governed by an equation
similar to Eq. (94). Combining this equation with (101), we obtain
p(BX) = p(AX) + 2|q(AX)| , (102)
which shows that, despite equality (100), the probability of being passive is larger than the
probability of acting under uncertainty. This is nothing but a particular case of the disjunction
effect.
This example shows that the conjunction fallacy is actually a sufficient condition for the oc-
currence of the disjunction effect, both resulting from the existence of interferences between prob-
abilities under uncertainty. The reverse does not hold: the disjunction effect does not necessarily
yield the conjunction fallacy, because the latter requires not only the existence of interferences,
but also that their amplitudes would be sufficiently large according to the conjunction-fallacy
condition (96).
To our knowledge, experiments or situations when the disjunction and conjunction effects
are observed simultaneously have not been investigated. The specific prediction coming from
the QDT, that the disjunction effect should be observable as soon as the conjunction effect is
present, provides a good test of QDT.
We have considered here the case when participants take decisions independently, without
consulting with each other. When decisions are taken in groups, the conjunction fallacy becomes
much weaker (Charness et al., 2008). In the language of QDT, the social interactions cause the
phenomenon of decoherence, which influences the strategic state and destroys the interferences.
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7 Conclusion
In the present paper, we have suggested a quantum theory of decision making. By its nature,
it can, of course, be realized by a quantum object, say, by a quantum computer. Or it can
be used as a scheme for quantum information processing and for creating artificial intelligence
based on quantum laws. This, however, is not compulsory. And the developed theory can also
be applied to non-quantum objects with an equal success. It just turns out that the language of
quantum theory is a very convenient tool for describing the process of decision making performed
by any decision maker, whether quantum or not. In this language, it is straightforward to char-
acterize such features of decision making as the entangled decision making, non-commutativity
of subsequent decisions, and intention interference. These features, although being quantum in
their description, at the same time, have natural and transparent interpretations in the simple
everyday language and are applicable to the events of the real life. To stress the applicability
of the approach to the decision making of human beings, we have provided a number of simple
illustrative examples.
We have demonstrated the applicability of our approach to the cases when the Savage sure-
thing principle is violated, resulting in the disjunction effect. Interference of intentions, arising in
decision making under uncertainty, possesses specific features caused by aversion to uncertainty.
The theorem of interference alternation that we have derived connects the aversion to uncertainty
to the appearance of negative interference terms suppressing the probability of actions. At the
same time, the probability of the decision maker not to act is enhanced by positive interfer-
ence terms. This alternating nature of the intention interference under uncertainty explains the
occurrence of the disjunction effect.
We have proposed a calculation of the interference terms, based on considerations using robust
assessment of probabilities, which makes it possible to predict their influence in a quantitative
way. The estimates are in good agreement with experimental data for the disjunction effect.
The conjunction fallacy, demonstrated by individual decision makers, is also explained by
the presence of the interference terms. A series of experiments are analysed and shown to be in
excellent agreement with the a priori evaluation of interference effects. The conjunction fallacy
is also shown to be a sufficient condition for the disjunction effect and novel experiments testing
the combined interplay between the two effects are suggested.
The main features of the Quantum Decision Theory can be summarized as follows.
(1) Quantum Decision Theory is a general mathematical approach that is applicable to ar-
bitrary situations. We do not try to adjust QDT to fit particular cases, but the same theory is
used throughout the paper to treat quite different effects.
(2) Mathematically, QDT is based on the theory of Hilbert spaces and techniques that have
been developed in quantum theory. However the use of these techniques serves only as a conve-
nient formal tool, implying no quantum nature of decision makers.
(3) Each decision maker possesses his/her own strategic state of mind, characterizing this
decision maker as a separate individual.
(4) The QDT developed here allows us to characterize not a single unusual, quantum-like,
property of the decision making process, but several of these characteristics, including entangled
decisions and the interference between intentions.
(5) Aversion with respect to uncertainty is an important feeling regulating decision mak-
ing. We formulate this general and ubiquitous feeling under the uncertainty-aversion principle,
35
connecting it to the signs of the alternating interference terms.
(6) We prove the theorem on interference alternation, which shows that the interference
between several intentions, arising under uncertainty, consists of several terms alternating in
sign, some being positive and some being negative. These terms are the source of the different
paradoxes and logical fallacies presented by humans making decisions in uncertain contexts.
(7) Uncertainty aversion and interference alternation, combined together, are the key fac-
tors that suppress the probability of acting and, at the same time, enhance the probability of
remaining passive, in the case of uncertainty.
(8) We demonstrate that it is not simply the interference between intentions as such, but
specifically the interference alternation, together with the uncertainty aversion, which is respon-
sible for the violation of Savage’s sure-thing principle at the origin of the disjunction effect.
(9) The conjunction fallacy is another effect that is caused by the interference of intentions,
together with the uncertainty-aversion principle. Without the latter, the conjunction fallacy
cannot be explained.
(10) The conjunction fallacy is shown to be a sufficient condition for the disjunction effect to
occur, exhibiting a deep link between the two effects.
(11) The general “interference-quarter law” is formulated, which provides a quantitative pre-
diction for the amplitude of the interference terms, and thus of the quantitative level by which
the sure-thing principle is violated.
(12) Detailed quantitative comparisons with experiments, documenting the disjunction effect
and the conjunction fallacy, confirm the validity of the derived laws.
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characteristics p(AX) p(AX1) q(AX)
A bank teller 0.241 0.401 -0.259
X1 feminist
A bird watcher 0.173 0.274 -0.327
X1 truck driver
A bicycle racer 0.160 0.226 -0.340
X1 nurse
A drum player 0.266 0.367 -0.234
X1 professor
A boxer 0.202 0.269 -0.298
X1 chef
A volleyboller 0.194 0.282 -0.306
X1 engineer
A librarian 0.152 0.377 -0.348
X1 aerobic trainer
A hair dresser 0.188 0.252 -0.312
X1 writer
A floriculturist 0.310 0.471 -0.190
X1 state worker
A bus driver 0.172 0.314 -0.328
X1 painter
A knitter 0.315 0.580 -0.185
X1 correspondent
A construction worker 0.131 0.249 -0.369
X1 labor-union president
A flute player 0.180 0.339 -0.320
X1 car mechanic
A student 0.392 0.439 -0.108
X1 fashion-monger
average 0.220 0.346 -0.280
Table 1. Conjunction fallacy and related interference terms caused by the decision under un-
certainty. The average interference term is in good agreement with the interference-quarter law.
The empirical data are taken from Shafir et al. (1990).
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